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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
SUGARHOUSE FINANCE COMPANY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,

)
)

)
)
)

-vsEUGENE L. ANDERSON and
COLLEEN W. AL'IDERSON,

Case No. 16462

)
)
)

)

Defendants-Respondents.)
)

)

BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS
NATURE OF THE CASE
This case involves the validity and effect of a settlement
agreement entered into by the parties on January 31, 1979.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The District Court held that the settlement agreement was
binding on the parties and entered its Order requiring the plaintiff
to carry out and complete the terms of that settlement.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks a reversal of the District Court's ruling
that the settlement agreement was valid and enforceable between the
parties.

In the alternative, appellant seeks a new trial in this

action.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
Based upon the failure of defendants to answer plaintiff's
Interrogatories, the District Court of Salt Lake County entered judgment
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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against the defendants on December 17, 1976, in the sum of $2,4);
plus interest, attorney's fees and court costs.

(R.22-3, 58) A

major portion of that judgment remained unpaid in January, 1979 ..

58' 95}

On January 29, 1979, the defendants were served at the;:

in Salina, Utah, with a Motion and Order in Supplemental Proceedi:

requiring them to appear before the court in Salt Lake County on,
February 20, 1979.

(R.58, 95)

Two days later, on January 31,

l~

defendant E;ugene L. Anderson traveled to Salt Lake City to meet·,::

Mr. Newman C. Petty, the owner and presiding officer of the plaid
finance company, concerning the amount due on the judgment.

His

purpose was to try to settle and satisfy the amount due and owin1
the plaintiff on the judgment.

(R. 38, 58, 95, 114)

Because of a serious automobile accident that occurred.
April, 1978, defendants were in dire financial difficulty at the:
of that visit.

Mr. Anderson had been hospitalized for one month,

he had been unable to work at his service station for an addition:
month because of the injuries he received in the accident.

(R.l~

His unpaid medical bills amounted to over $9, 000. 00, and his add;:
obligations exceeded $30,000.00 at that time.

(R.101-103)

Anderson told Petty about his accident and about his i~
cial difficulties when he met with him at his office in Salt Lah
City to discuss the obligation.

(_R. 95-6)

Anderson had never ha;

other judgments against him, and he wanted to get this one settli

(R.113)
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After some discussion about Anderson's ability to pay the
amount due, including comments about possible bankruptcy, the parties reached a settlement agreement.

Under its terms, plaintiff agreed

to accept the sum of $2,200.00 in full payment and satisfaction of the

the existing judgment.

(R.38, 59, 96, 115)

Anderson then made and delivered his check in the sum of
$2,200.00 to Mr. Petty in full payment of the settlement amount.

The

check was drawn on Zion's First National Bank, Salina, Utah, and the
purpose of payment was stated on the check in the following language:
"Payment in full judgment civil

ffo

236207."

(Exhibit 1, R. 38, 59, 96)

Anderson requested that Petty retain the check for two days
while he made arrangements for the check to clear the bank.
115)

(R.59,97,

After those arrangements had been completed, Anderson called

Petty to tell him the check would clear.

(R.59, 104-106)

At the

time of that call, Petty notified Anderson that he had decided not
to accept the settlement and that he would return the check by mail.
(R.39, 59, 100)
day.

Anderson received the check in Salina the following

(R.39., 100)

Mr. Petty revoked the settlement agreement when he learned
that Anderson had some money coming from the sale of some real
property in Salina, Utah.

(R.116-117)

Mr. Anderson had made arrange-

ments to sell two acres of property in association with a co-owner,
but he was to receive only $2,000.00 from the transaction.

That amount

was to be used to pay some of the many bills he owed at that time.
(R.107-8, 116)
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- 4 Thereafter, the defendants filed their Motion for

an~
I

requiring the plaintiff to carry out and complete the terms of
settlement referred to above.

(R. 40)

n,

The Affidavit of Eugene L.

Anderson was filed in support of that Motion.

(R.38-9)

Hearing.;

the Motion was first set for Thursday, February 15, 1979, but was
continued on stipulation of the parties to March 13, 1979.

Based

upon the oral and documentary evidence submitted by the parties at.
the hearing, the court entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusiot
of Law and then ordered that defendants' Motion· should be granted
The Order also required that defendants immediately pay the

plaint~

the sum of $2, 200. 00 in the form of a Cashier's Check to represen:I
full settlement and satisfaction of the judgment previously entere\•
the court.

Plaintiff was required by the Order to enter Sa tis fact

of Judgment when payment was received.
were signed on April 13, 1979.

The Findings and the Order!

(R.58,61)

The Cashier's Check was delivered to the office of

p~~

tiff's counsel on March 16, 1979, and he retained possession of thl
check for a period of 54 days before returning to defendants' ~ounl
on May 9, 1979.

(R. 71-2)

Upon motion of the plaintiff, the Findi~

i

I

of Fact and Conclusions of Law were amended by the court on June

1979.

(R.

89~92)

[

Notice of Appeal was timely filed, and plaintiff asks t:I
Supreme Court for relief from the legal effect of the settlement
agreement.
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ARGUMENT
POINT NO. I
THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT ENTERED
INTO BY THE PARTIES WAS SUPPORTED
BY ADEQUATE CONSIDERATION
The trial court found that the agreement formulated by the
parties on January 3, 1979, was based upon an adequate

(R.91)

con~ideraton.

Appellant asserts on this appeal that the evidence adduced at

the hearing on respondents' Motion to require appellant to carry out
and complete the terms of the settlement does not support that finding.
On this basis, appellant seeks reversal of the Order entered by the
District Court.
The general common-law rule pertaining to accord and satisfaction provides that an agreement by a creditor to accept part payment
of a liquidated debt as payment in full does not discharge the whole
debt unless it is supported by a new and additional consideration.
FMA Financial Corporation v. Build, Inc., 17 U.2d 80, 404 P.2d 670(1965).
The Utah court has recognized that rigid application of this
rule can occasionally result in great inequity,

In the FMA case, the

court noted that the modern trend in the courts is to find a consideration somewhere in the new arrangement between the parties,

The lang-

uage of the court, found on page 673, recognizes that the courts now
follow the more equitable result in such cases:
"It is true that the modern trend is to be cautious about
rigidly applying this rule and that courts are generally
somewhat indulgent toward finding consideration somewhere
in the new arrangement, such as that it was to settl~ a
dispute, or that there is some advantage to the cr~ditor
in accepting the lesser amount, where the unreasoning
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to the
rule might result in inequity."
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In another case, the Utah court has recognized that th

e:I

be varying circumstances in which the debtor is induced by the re\i
of the creditor to make payment in some manner other than he is ot..
gated to do,

If he is so induced, and if he suffers some legal de·
1

ment in making the payment, there is consideration for the promise,
the debt is discharged.
535 P,2d 1228(1975).

See Tates v. Little American Refining CoQ

In 1 Am Jur 2d, Accord and Satisfaction,

p,311, the author states that the general rule is not looked

rn

~ 00 ~

favor by the court and that the application of exceptions to this :

1

have been more numerous than those of the rule itself, the court;:/
ing upon slight circumstances to take the cases away from the operl
of the rule.

In §35, the author states that the rule has been muc:

criticized and condenmed and many exceptions have been made to avo:
the injustice and inequity that frequently result
ment of the rule,

from strict enfo·1

Referring to the requirement of additional com:.

ation, the author gives the following explanation:

I

"Whether or not the basis of the rule as it was originally I
adopted was lack of consideration, it is evident that the
theory of the rule as it obtains at the present time is one
of consideration for the discharge of the residue of the
I
debt, and if some consideration which is new or collateral .
to the partial payment enters into the agreement, it will, '
when executed, be upheld as good accord and satisfaction.
I
The collateral or additional consideration may consist of
anything which would be a burden or inconvenience to the. one !
party or a possible benefit to the other, the fact that it !
is significant or technical being innnaterial,"

I

Some of the courts have even allowed the insolvency of c
debtor to act as sufficent consideration to uphold the new agreeme:
to accept the lesser amount.

In 1 Am Jur 2d, Accord and Satisfac'l
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I

- 7 §38, p.337, the author discusses the effect of insolvency of the
debtor as follows:
"Where the debtor is known to the creditor to be insolvent
and the creditor, in consideration of such fact, agrees to'
and does accept part payment of a liquidated demand (at
least one which is dischargable in bankruptcy) in full satisfaction, the courts generally hold that the rule that a
liquidated and matured debt is not discharged by the payment
and acceptance of a less sum in satisfaction is not applicable,
and the transaction will be upheld as a good accord and
satisfaction, even though it is subsequently proven that the
debtor was not insolvent."
In an older annotation found in 96 ALR 1133 pertaining to
the general rule, the author discusses the adequacy of consideration
for a promise to accept less than the full amount in full payment as
follows:
".,.,However, it is well settled that if there is any
benefit to the creditor, or detriment to the debtor, resulting from the new contract, a consideration sufficient to
support it exists."
In the case now before the court, there was sufficient consideration to support the promise of the appellant to accept a lesser
amount in

p~yment

of the judgment pending against the respondents.

Unrefuted evidence shows that Eugene L. Anderson was injured in an
accident on April 13, 1978, which required that he be hospitalized
for a long period of time.

In addition, he was away from his busines-

for an additional period of time after he was released from the hospital
To make matters worse, his service station business was not doing well.
He had been unable to support his family during the previous year, and
his obligations were well over $30,000.00, in addition to the medical
expenses resulting from the accident.

(R.101-103)

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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- 8 In order to obtain the funds needed to pay the settleme

amount, Anderson told Petty that he would arrange for a loan at t
local bank.

These arrangements were completed so that immediate

ment of the settlement amount could be made.
The original judgment had been entered by the court on
December 17, 1976.

In the previous two years, the appellant had

with little success in collecting the amount of the judgment.

Th

settlement agreement between the parties provided for immediatep
ment of a substantial amount of that judgment.

The appellant was

thereby relieved of further efforts to collect the amount due. S

mental, Garnishment and Execution proceedings were no longer nece

and appe11·ant could close its books on this account and direct it

efforts to collection of other pending judgments and accounts. T

respondents, on the other hand, had to look forward to the paymen

the loan, including any interest connected therewith, as a substi
to the satisfied judgment.

The settlement agreement formulatedb

the parties in this instance invo 1 ved the advantage of immediate

ment to the plaintiff'and the disadvantage of loan arrangements t
defendants.

Under both the letter and the spirit of the modern t

recognized by the Utah court in the case of FMA Financial Corpora

Build, Inc., supra, there was sufficient and adequate considerati
support the agreement of the parties for accord and satisfaction
the judgment pending in this action.
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- 9 Appellant relies primarily on the case of Ralph A. Badger
and Company v. Fidelity Building and Loan Association, 94 U 97, 75 p. 2d
669(1968) in support of its position in this case.

Respondents do not

disagree with the principles laid down in that case, but they hasten
to point out that the case turned more on the fraud of the defendant
than on lack of consideration.

The defendant building and loan associa-

tion had adopted a policy under which it had ceased to accept and pay
amounts owing on stock withdrawals and had used its income for other
purposes.

When plaintiff presented his stock certificate for payment,

he was fraudulently informed that it was not yet due and payable and
that other certificates having an aggregate value of $50,000.00 had to

be paid ahead of his.

These representations were clearly false.

The

plaintiff then sold the certificate for one-half of its true value to
a third party who turned out to be an agent of the defendant who was
using defendant's money to buy the certificates at the discounted rate.
The entire arrangement was designed to purchase the stock withdrawals
at less than their face values.

The defendant was guilty of serious

fraud, and the court emphasized the facts relating thereto.
The circumstances of this case show sufficient consideration
to support the parties' settlement agreement.

The adverse financial

situation of the defendants and their need to obtain a loan to pay off
the settlement amount was adequate consideration to support their side
of the settlement agreement.

On the other hand, the promise of an

immediate return to the plaintiff gave sufficient benefit to make the
agreement of the parties binding and enforceable.
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- 10 POINT NO. II
DEFENDANTS WERE GUILTY OF NO FRAUD,
MISREPRESENTATION OR DECEIT IN
PROCURRING THE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT.

There is no evidence in the record to support appellant':
contention that the settlement agreement between the parties was
tained by fraud, misrepresentation, or deceit.
Newman Petty testified that he rescinded the settlement
agreement because he received a telephone call from a title company
advising him that Mr. Anderson was attempting to sell some real
property in Salina, Utah.

(_R.116)

Anderson admitted that he had

arranged for the sale of certain real property in concert with its

co-owner, Mr. Keith Cannon, but he further testified that the total
amount that he would realize from the sale was in the sum of

$2,00~.

He was intending to use that amount to pay off some of the other
that he owed.

(_R.107-8)

o

The sum expected from the sale was not

sufficient to change the circumstances of the defendants when the
meeting with Mr. Petty was held,

They were still in dire financia

straits, having at least $39, 000. 00 pending in outstanding obligat

The small amount to be received at the sale was earmarked to hold 1
other creditors who were threatening to take court action against
Andersons.

Those funds had apparently been pledged to cover other

debts because Anderson still was required to obtain a loan to pay
the amount promised to the Sugarhouse Finance Company.

The amount

realized from the sale probably made it possible for Anderson to
the loan needed to satisfy the judgment.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Appellant contends in its brief on appeal that defendnat
Eugene Anderson testified that he had no assets whatsoever.

A careful

review of the evidence about the meeting of the parties reveals no
testimony to this effect,

Both of the parties testified that Mr,

Anderson discussed his dire financial circumstances.

Anyone familiar

with bankruptcy proceedings must recognize that even persons who are
adjudged to be insolvent may nevertheless possess numerous assets.

In

this instance, the problem was created by the large number of obligations that had accumulated because of the accident of Mr. Anderson
and the decrease in income from his business.

The record reveals no

! statements about the lack of assets on the part of the defendants.

I

l

I

I

J

It is elementary under Utah law that allegations of fraud
must be shown by clear and convincing evidence and will not lie in
mere suspicion or inuendo.

See Lundstrom v. Radio Corporation of

America, 405 P.2d 339, 17 U.2d 114, 14 ALR 3rd 1058,

The question as

to whether Eugene Anderson had dealt fraudulently with the plaintiff
was an issue of fact that was resolved by the court after hearing the
evidence adduced at the hearing on defendants' Motion,

Although the

court found that Mr. Anderson was anticipating the sale of certain real
property in Sevier County when he went to see Mr, Petty, the court
also found that his actions were not fraudulent in any way,

In other

words, the plaintiff failed to show by clear and convincing evidence
that Mr. Anderson defrauded the plaintiff,

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The decision of the fact finder must stand unless the de
sion was clearly erroneous.

The Utah Supreme Court has held that.

an action at law the question on appeal is not whether the evidenci

would have supported a judgment in favor of the appellant, but whe:

the judgment entered by the trial court finds support in the evide[
Green v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the U. S., 284 p .2d
3 U. 2d 3 7 5.

oi

The Supreme Court will not disturb the findings of fa

of the lower court when the evidence, when viewed in a light most
favorable to the winning party, is sufficient to sustain such find:
See Gibbons

& Reed Company v. Guthrie, 256 P.2d 706, 123 U 172.

The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that if there is''·
stantial evidence to support a judgment of the court below in an

a1

at law, the Supreme Court will affirm.

·1.

Larsen,

491 P. 2d 226, 26 U. 2d 429.

Leon Glazier & Sons Inc.

The Supreme Court review in lo

cases is limited to the determination of whether or not there is

competent evidence to support the judgment of the trial court. Dat
v. George Romney

& Sons Company, 184 P.2d 211, 111 U 471.

The evidence pertaining to the question of fraud, when v:
in a light most favorable to the respondents, is clearly sufficien!
support the judgment of the District Court.

The amount to be rece:;

from the sale of property was only a drop in the bucket when compa::
with the impending obligations of the Anderson family.

The failur<

reveal the facts surrounding the sale of that propery made no difi:'
whatsoever to the settlement agreement, and would not have affect<:
outcome of the negotiations between the parties,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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The evidence pertaining to the question of consideration,
when viewed in a light most favorable to the respondents, is also
sufficient to support the judgment of the District Court

It is

undisputed that the defendants were in dire financial circumstances
at the time of the settlement agreement, and no one questions the
Anderson testimony that it was necessary for him to obtain an loan to
pay the settlement amount.

The court can take judicial notice of the

fact that no further collection efforts would be necessary once the
settlement amount was paid,

The evidence is sufficient to support

the Order of the court, and that decision should be upheld by this
court on appeal.
POINT NO, III
APPELLANT HAD AMPLE OPPORTUNITY TO
CONDUCT DISCOVERY PROCEEDINGS PRIOR
TO THE HEARING ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION.
The appellant claims on this appeal that it was afforded no
opportunity for discovery work prior to the hearing on the Motion filed
by the respondents.

The record shows no attempt by the plaintiff to

initiate any discovery procedures prior to the hearing on March 13,
1979.

When the hearing convened, counsel for appellant objected to

further proceedings on the ground that he had not had opportunity to
complete his discovery work.

Of course, this objection was overruled.

The record shows that respondents' Motion was filed on
February 8, 1979.

Hearing was first scheduled on February 15, 1979,

but was continued upon stipulation of the parties until March 13, 1979.
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A period of 33 days passed between the filing of the Motion and tt
hearing held by the court.

The Motion was supported by the Affida

of defendant Eugene L. Anderson, and his contentions were clearly
fore the court and the appellant at that time,

Any necessary disc,

work by the appellant was ignored until the time of the hearing.

Interrogatories were filed, no Depositions were scheduled, no Requ,
for Admissions were made, and no other steps were taken to carry

01

the discovery proceedings available to the appellant under the Utai
Rules of Civil Procedure.
The courts have always required the parties to act with
dispatch and diligence in litigation matters.

The party desiring

take advantage of the ·discovery procedures must take the initiativ1
to go forward with the preparation of his case.

Arrangements for

preparation lie in the hands of counsel and not in the hands of thi
court.

It is noteworthy that the appellant didn't even subpoena an

witnesses to the hearing,

The only witness called to testify on

appellant's behalf was defendant Eugene L, Anderson, who was calle1
for cross-examination purposes only,

The problems related to lack

discovery in the matter now before the court were caused by the la
of diligence on the part of the appellant and not because of any e~
on the part of the court,
POINT NO, IV
DEFENDANTS FOLLOWED PROPER
PLEADING PROCEDURE IN
CONNECTION WITH THIS ACTION.
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- 15 Appellant complains in its Brief that defendants' Motion
for an Order requiring the plaintiff to carry out and complete the
terms of a settlement entered into by the parties on January 31, 1979,
did not comply with established pleading procedure because it was not
made pursuant to any rule or statute.

This contention has no merit

because the Motion conforms to the provisions of Rule 60, Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure.

Paragraph (b) of that Rule provides, in pertinent

part, as follows:
"On mot ion and upcn such term as are just, the court may in
the futherance of justice relieve a party or his legal
representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding
for the following reasons , . , (6) the judgment has been
satisfied, released, or discharged, . . . or it is no longer
equitable that the judgment should have prospective applications; , . , The procedure for obtaining any rel i e f from a
judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these Rules or
by an independent action,"
The above Rule defines the procedure that must be followed in
cases like the one before the court,

The Motion was proper, and the

court had adequate jurisdiction to proceed with the resolution of the
problem raised by the parties,
CONCLUSION
For reasons set forth above, the decision and Order of the
District Court requiring the plaintiff to complete and carry out the
settlement agreement should be affirmed,
DATED this 23rd day of October, 1979.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED,
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/ ~. f~~~\./L---Z~ n-~H. RALPH KL
Attorney for Respondents
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NOTICE OF SERVICE
The foregoing Brief on Appeal was served upon the appelL
by mailing two copies thereof to its attorneys, Moyle & Draper,

6~!

Deseret Plaza, Salt Lake City, Utah, 84111, by United States Mail,
postage prepaid, this 24th day of October, 1979.
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